HONS 182 Neuroethics – Fall 2006
December 13, 2006
1. The new field of neuroethics
a. William
Safire is credited with coining the term neuroethics.
b. We will use this book
c.
We will start by discussing this paper
d. For those who are interested, here are some other resources
2. Mind-brain relations
a.
Basics of brain function
b. Linking
mental and neural function
i. Outline
on the brain and volition
ii. Tom Wolfe, Sorry, But Your Soul Just Died
iii. Schall
JD. On building a bridge between brain and behavior. Annu Rev
Psychol. 2004;55:23-50.
c.
Decision making
i. Schall JD. Decision making. Current Biology 2005. 15:R9-R11.
ii. Schall JD. Neural basis of deciding, choosing and acting. Nat Rev Neurosci. 2001 Jan;2(1):33-42.
d.
Free will
i. Is
God a Taoist By Raymond Smullyan, 1977
U.S.
Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be [...]
compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property,
without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
[...] No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. [...]
1. Washington v. Harper (1990)
Respondent Harper has
been a ward of the Washington state
penal system since his 1976 robbery conviction. Both as an inmate and
while
temporarily on parole, he received psychiatric treatment, including the
consensual administration of antipsychotic drugs. He has engaged in
violent
conduct, and his condition has deteriorated when he did not take the
drugs. On
two occasions, he was transferred to the Special Offender Center, a
state
institute for convicted felons with serious mental illness, where he
was
diagnosed as suffering from a manic-depressive disorder. While at the
Center,
he was required to take antipsychotic drugs against his will pursuant
to an SOC
Policy. The Policy provides:
- that, if a psychiatrist
orders
such medication, an inmate may be involuntarily treated only if he
(1) suffers from a
"mental
disorder" and (2) is "gravely disabled" or poses a
"likelihood of serious
harm" to himself or
others;
- that, after a hearing
and upon
a finding that the above conditions are met, a special committee
consisting of a
psychiatrist, a
psychologist, and a Center official, none of whom may be currently
involved in the inmate's
diagnosis or treatment, may order involuntary medication if the
psychiatrist is in the
majority;
- and that the inmate has
the
right to notice of the hearing, the right to attend, present evidence,
and cross-examine
witnesses, the
right to representation by a disinterested lay adviser versed in
the psychological issues,
the
right to appeal to the Center's Superintendent, and the right to
periodic review of any
involuntary medication ordered. In addition, state law gives him the
right to
state-court review of the
committee's decision.
Both of the involuntary
treatment
proceedings were conducted in accordance with the SOC Policy. During his second stay at the Center, but
before his transfer to a state penitentiary, Harper filed suit.
2. Riggins v. Nevada (1992)
When petitioner Riggins,
while awaiting a Nevada trial on
murder and robbery charges, complained of hearing voices and having
sleep
problems, a psychiatrist prescribed the antipsychotic drug Mellaril.
After he
was found competent to stand trial, Riggins made a motion to suspend
the
Mellaril's administration until after his trial, arguing that its use
infringed
upon his freedom, that its effect on his demeanor and mental state
during trial
would deny him due process, and that he had the right to show jurors
his true
mental state when he offered an insanity defense. After hearing the
testimony
of doctors who had examined Riggins, the trial court denied the motion
with a
one page order giving no indication of its rationale. At Riggins'
trial, he
presented his insanity defense and testified, was convicted, and was
sentenced
to death.
3. Sell v. United States (2003)
Charles Sell, once a practicing dentist, has a long and unfortunate history of mental illness. In September 1982, after telling doctors that the gold he used for fillings had been contaminated by communists, Sell was hospitalized, treated with antipsychotic medication, and subsequently discharged. In June 1984, Sell called the police to say that a leopard was outside his office boarding a bus, and then he asked the police to shoot him. Sell was again hospitalized and subsequently released. On various occasions, he complained that public officials... were trying to kill him. In April 1997, he told law enforcement personnel that he “spoke to God last night,” and that “God told me every [FBI] person I kill, a soul will be saved.”
In May 1997, the Government charged Sell with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment. A Federal Magistrate Judge, after ordering a psychiatric examination found Sell “currently competent,” but noted that Sell might experience “a psychotic episode” in the future. The judge released Sell on bail. A grand jury later produced a superseding indictment charging Sell and his wife with 56 counts of mail fraud, 6 counts of Medicaid fraud, and 1 count of money laundering.
In early 1998, the Government claimed that Sell had sought to intimidate a witness. The Magistrate held a bail revocation hearing. Sell’s behavior at his initial appearance was, in the judge’s words, “totally out of control,” involving “screaming and shouting,” the use of “personal insults” and “racial epithets,” and spitting “in the judge’s face.” A psychiatrist reported that Sell could not sleep because he expected the FBI to “come busting through the door,” and concluded that Sell’s condition had worsened. After considering that report and other testimony, the Magistrate revoked Sell’s bail.
In April 1998, the grand jury issued a new indictment charging Sell with attempting to murder the FBI agent who had arrested him and a former employee who planned to testify against him in the fraud case. The attempted murder and fraud cases were joined for trial.
In early 1999, Sell asked the Magistrate to reconsider his competence to stand trial. The Magistrate sent Sell to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, for examination. Subsequently the Magistrate found that Sell was “mentally incompetent to stand trial.” He ordered Sell to “be hospitalized for treatment” at the Medical Center for up to four months, “to determine whether there was a substantial probability that [Sell] would attain the capacity to allow his trial to proceed.”
Two months later, Medical Center staff recommended that Sell take antipsychotic medication. Sell refused to do so. The staff sought permission to administer the medication against Sell’s will. That effort is the subject of the present proceedings.